In a point-to-point communication system which consists of a sender s, a receiver t and a set of noiseless channels, the sender s wants to transmit a private message to the receiver t through the channels which may be eavesdropped by a wiretapper. The wiretapper can access any one but not more than one set of channels, which is referred to as a wiretap set. It is assumed that from each wiretap set, the wiretapper can obtain some partial information about the private message which is measured by the wiretapper's equivocation. The security strategy is to encode the message with some random key. Under these settings, we define an achievable rate tuple in terms of the message, the key and the wiretapper's equivocation, and prove a tight rate region of the rate tuples.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information-theoretic security was launched by Shannon in his seminal paper [8] , in which a sender wants to transmit a private message to a receiver with the existence of a wiretapper. This model, referred to as the Shannon cipher system, requires that the wiretapper can obtain no information about the message. In this paper, we will refer to it as perfect security for ease of discussion. In order to protect the message, the sender encodes the message with a random key which is shared with the receiver a priori but unknown to the wiretapper. The sender transmits the ciphertext on a public channel to the receiver and the receiver can recover the message by the key and ciphertext. For the wiretapper, it can obtain no information about the private message without the key; i.e. the ciphertext is statistically independent of the message. The conclusion, known as the perfect secrecy theorem, is that the the size of the key should be not less than the size of the message if perfect security is required. A recent result by Ho et al. in [5] showed an even stronger bound: in the Shannon cipher system, the size of the key is lower bounded by the logarithm of the cardinality of the message alphabet. The Shannon cipher system was generalized to secret sharing by Blakley [1] and Shamir [7] . Ozarow and Wyner [6] also studied a similar problem which they called the wiretap channel II. In this model, information is sent to the receiver through a set of point-to-point channels. It is assumed that the wiretapper can access any one but not more than one set of channels, called a wiretap set, out of a collection A of all possible wiretap sets, where A is specified by the problem under consideration. In [6] , A consists of all the subsets of the channel set with size r. The strategy to protect the private message is the same as that in the Shannon cipher system. Specifically, they proved a lower bound on the size of the key which can be attained by a group code. This result is further generalized in Cheng and Yeung [3] for an arbitrary A. They proved a lower bound on the size of the key and showed that it can be achieved by a linear code.
Imperfect secrecy was independently studied in Yamamoto [10] and Yeung [11] (p. 116). The communication model in [11] is the same as the model described in the Shannon cipher system, except that the wiretapper can obtain partial information about the message, which is measured by the mutual information between the message and the symbols obtained by the wiretapper. The imperfect secrecy theorem states that this mutual information is lower bounded by the difference between the size of the message and the size of the key. In [10] , Yamamoto studied source coding problems for Shannon cipher system with correlated source outputs (X, Y ) by considering several situations such that both X and Y , only X, or only Y must be transmitted to the receiver, or both X and Y , only X, or only Y must be kept secret from the wiretapper. The admissible region of the cryptogram rate and the key rate for a given security level is derived for each case. A result equivalent to the perfect secrecy theorem is proved in the converse part. When imperfect security is considered in a wiretap network G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of channels, Cai and Yeung in [2] proved two tight bounds on the minimum length of the key and the maximum length of the message, provided that the collection A of all the possible wiretap sets consists of all the subsets of E with size r and the information leakage about the message in each wiretap set is at most i log q, where i is a fixed integer satisfying 0 ≤ i ≤ r and q is the size of the alphabet.
Xu and Chen in [9] studied how to communicate securely over a network in which each channel may be noisy or noiseless. Their model is a single-source single-sink acyclic planar network without network coding and the communication between the source and the sink is subject to non-cooperative eavesdropping on each link, namely A consists of all the subsets of the channel set with a singe channel. From each wiretap set in A, the wiretapper can obtain partial information about the message, which is measured by the wiretapper's equivocation. They defined an achievable rate tuple including the message rate, the key rate and the equivocation rate for each wiretap set. They proved sufficient conditions in terms of the communication rates and the network parameters for provably secure communication, along with an intuitive and efficient coding scheme. Furthermore, the derived achievable rate region is tight for several special cases. In the following, we refer to this model as the non-cooperative imperfect secrecy system.
In this work, we define a security model which generalizes the model in [6] . The communication model is the same as that in [6] . The main difference here is that in our model A is arbitrary and from each wiretap set in A, the wiretapper may obtain some information about the message. On the other hand, our model subsumes the noiseless part of the model in [9] , since the communication in a single-source single-sink network without network coding can be simplified as a pointto-point system. We also define an achievable rate tuple similar to that in [9] and a tight rate region is proved under these settings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we give the problem formulation and introduce some related results in Section II. Then we present our main result on the rate region in Section III including the converse and the achievability. At last, we conclude in Section IV.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND RELATED RESULT

A. Problem Formulation
The communication model in our problem is described as follows:
• The communication is between a transmitter s and a receiver t, which are connected by a set of point-to-point noiseless channels. Let E = {e 1 , e 2 , ..., e h } be the set of channels and h = |E|. Symbols transmitted on the channels are from a common alphabet F and q = |F|. For each channel e i , 1 ≤ i ≤ h, the channel capacity is C i log q, where C i is an integer. Denote the symbols transmitted on e i by Y ei . • The message M is generated at the transmitter s according to a uniform distribution on the message set M. The key K, also generated at the transmitter s, takes value in an alphabet K according to the uniform distribution, and is independent of M . The transmitter needs to send the ciphertext to the receiver and the receiver needs to recover both the message and the key. The rates of the message and the key are defined as follows. 
The achievable rate tuple is defined as follows.
The rate region R is defined as the set of all achievable rate tuples (R M , R K , R i:1≤i≤d ). In the sequel, we refer to this model as a cooperative imperfect secrecy system.
Next, we define the achievable rate tuple by a block code in terms of M , K and Y Ii ,
where M n ∈ M n ⊆ M n , K n ∈ K n ⊆ K n , and Y Ii,n ∈ F n .
The inequality in (6) means that, for any positive real number ε, there is a positive integer n 0 such that
for all n ≥ n 0 .
In the sequel, we assume that the base of the logarithm in the entropy quantities (e.g., H(X), I(X; Y )) is q. Then the factor 1 log q can be omitted in (1)-(6).
B. Related Result
1) Perfect and Imperfect Secrecy: The perfect secrecy theorem in [8] is stated as follows.
Theorem 1 (Perfect Secrecy Theorem). Let X be the plain text, Y be the ciphertext, and K be the key in a secret key cryptosystem. If perfect secrecy is achieved, i.e., I(X; Y ) = 0, then H(K) ≥ H(X).
In the wiretap network model [2] , the following result similar to the perfect secrecy theorem was proved.
Theorem 2. 1 In a wiretap network, let K be the key and Y I be the symbols transmitted in wiretap set I. Then
As a generalization of the perfect secrecy theorem, the imperfect secrecy theorem in [11] (p. 116) is stated below.
Theorem 3 (Imperfect Secrecy Theorem). Let X be the plain text, Y be the ciphertext, and K be the key in a secret key cryptosystem. Then
In the above theorem, if I(X; Y ) = 0, then (9) becomes (7), i.e., the theorem reduces to the perfect secrecy theorem. In [10] , it was proved that for any secret key cryptosystem,
which is equivalent to (9) .
2) Secure Coding over Networks: The system model in [9] is a single-source single-sink directed acyclic network with the assumption that each wiretapper can access only one channel and there is no network coding in the network. Each channel in the network may be noisy or noiseless.
When all the channels in the network are noiseless, the network can be simplified as a point-to-point communication system, in which each channel is a path from the source node to the destination node in the original network and the set of wiretap sets A is arbitrary. Hence our model subsumes the non-cooperative model for this special case.
In [9] , an achievable rate region of rate tuples was obtained for noisy channels, and the region was shown to be tight for several special cases. Based on the achievable rate region, they also gave an algorithm for constructing a secure code on the network.
In a network G = (V, E), a cut is a partition (W, W c ) of the set of vertices V such that W ∪W c = V and W ∩W c = ∅, and the cut-set is the set of the edges from W to W c . The achievable rate region for noiseless channels is stated below. Theorem 4 (Theorem 2, [9] ). A rate tuple (R M , R K , R e ), e ∈ E, is achievable, if there exist auxiliary numbers r e such that
In the above, R e and C e correspond to R i and C i in our formulation; E Cut is the set of channels across a given cut Cut.
III. RATE REGION OF THE RATE TUPLE
The main result of this paper is a characterization of the rate region R given by the following theorem.
where r i s satisfy
A. Converse
In this section, we prove that if (R M , R K , R i:1≤i≤d ) ∈ R, then the constraints (11)-(16) hold. Since the converse is valid for both the blocking coding and single-shot coding, we just prove the single-shot coding for simplicity. The constraints (13) and (14) are obvious.
We first prove the constraint (12). By the constraint (3),
Hence the constraints (12)-(14) hold. Let us consider an equivalent condition of constraint (3).
The constraint (3) is equivalent to
By (17) and (18),
Next, we prove a lemma which generalizes Theorem 2.
Lemma 1. In a cooperative imperfect secrecy system, let M be the message, K be the key and Y I be the symbols transmitted in wiretap set I. Then
Proof: Since I(M ; K) = 0 and H(Y I |M, K) = 0,
In the next theorem, we prove the constraints (11), (15), and (16).
Proof: By Lemma 1 and the inequality (19), for each wiretap set I i ,
Since Y (ei:1≤i≤h) is a function of (M, K) and (M, K) can be recovered by Y (ei:1≤i≤h) ,
Hence,
which is equivalent to
..,ei−1) ).
Then for all I j , 1 ≤ j ≤ d, e l ∈Ij ,l<i) ).
Furthermore,
which completes the proof.
B. Achievability
In this section, we prove that (R M , R K , R i:1≤i≤d ) ∈ R if there exists (r 1 , r 2 , ..., r h ) such that the constraints (11)-(16) are satisfied.
In the following, a special code in which the symbols sent on the channels are mutually independent is studied. We design a block code with length n as follows. The sender generates M and K at rates R M and R K , respectively, and sends symbols on each channel e i (1 ≤ i ≤ h) at rate r i . Next, we prove that the tuple (R M , R K , R i:1≤i≤d ) can be attained by a linear code.
Let the symbols on channel e i (1 ≤ i ≤ h) be Y ei . For simplicity, assume that the quantities c i , C i , R M , R K , and r i are all rationales, so that there is a sufficiently large n such that
are all integers. Thus, by (11) , (15), and (16), n M , n K , and (n 1 , n 2 , ..., n h ) satisfy that
When n → ∞,
Hence, when n → ∞, ( n1 n , n2 n , ..., n h n ) and (r 1 , r 2 , ..., r h ) are equivalent.
For a matrix A, we write the number of rows and columns of A as row(A) and col(A), respectively. The following two lemmas are instrumental in the subsequent proofs. Hence,
The remaining of this paper is largely about the following theorem. Theorem 6. When q > |A| is a prime power, if the integer tuple (n 1 , n 2 , ..., n h ) satisfies (27)-(29), then there exists a linear code such that H(M n ) = n M and H(K n ) = n K .
Proof: The code can be constructed as follows: Let the finite field F q be the common alphabet of M and K and the common alphabet of all the channels F = F q . The symbols transmitted on channel e i (1 ≤ i ≤ h) is taken from F ni q , which means there are n i symbols from F q transmitted on e i . Let x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n M +n K be all the symbols to send, where the first n 1 symbols are sent on e 1 , the next n 2 symbols are sent on e 2 , ..., and the last n h symbols are sent on e h . We construct x i 's according to their positions in the sequence.
Generate n K mutually independent symbols K = (k 1 , k 2 , ..., k n K ) from F q . Transmit K at the first n K positions, i.e., 1, 2, ..., n K . Namely,
Generate n M (= h i=1 n i − n K ) mutually independent message symbols (m 1 , m 2 , ..., m n M ) from F q . For the remaining n M positions in {e i : 1 ≤ i ≤ h}, transmit the encrypted message by the encoding function:
where b i ∈ F n K q is a row vector to be determined in the following steps.
We need to construct {b i : n K + 1 ≤ i ≤ n K + n M } such that: (a) These n K +n M symbols are mutually independent, which is equivalent to that both M and K can be recovered at node t. From the previous discussions, we can see that receiver t can recover K from the symbols in the first n K positions and by equation (30), M can be also recovered by
Hence, the required condition is satisfied.
(b) The constraint (19) (which is equivalent to (3)) should hold for all the wiretap sets. For {x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n M +n K }, ⎛ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝
(The remaining of the proof is omitted due to the page limit. For the full version of this paper, please refer to [4] for a complete proof of the theorem.)
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proved a tight rate region for the cooperative imperfect secrecy model in terms of a linear program, in which the key idea is from the imperfect secrecy theorem. The result can be treated as a bound from a cut-set if network coding is allowed in a general wiretap network. Although for a general case, the rate region of rate tuples is still open, our result has paved the way for the further discussion on this problem.
